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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 15-1847 
___________ 
  
JAY BONANZA BRILEY, 
               Appellant 
 
v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL UNITED STATES OF AMERICA;  
WARDEN LORETTO FCI 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(W.D. Pa. No. 3-14-cv-00193) 
District Court Judge:  Honorable Kim R. Gibson 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted on Motion for Possible Summary Action  
Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
December 17, 2015 
 
Before: CHAGARES, GREENAWAY, JR., and SLOVITER, Circuit Judges 
 
 (Filed: January 14, 2016) 
_________ 
 
OPINION* 
_________ 
 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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PER CURIAM 
 Jay Bonanza Briley, a federal inmate, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus 
under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 seeking to challenge the Bureau of Prison’s (“BOP”) 
determination that a Greater Security Management Variable should be applied to his 
custody classification.1  The District Court determined that such a challenge was not 
cognizable in federal habeas and dismissed the petition.  Briley appealed, and the 
appellees moved for summary action.  Because this appeal presents no substantial 
question, we will grant the appellees’ motion and summarily affirm.  See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 
27.4; I.O.P. 10.6. 
 We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise plenary review over 
the District Court’s dismissal order.  See United States v. Friedland, 83 F.3d 1531, 1542 
(3d Cir. 1996).     
 We agree with the District Court that Briley’s challenge to his custody 
classification is not cognizable in a § 2241 petition because he does not challenge the 
basic fact or duration of his imprisonment, which is the “essence of habeas.”  See Preiser 
v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973).  Nor does Briley’s claim challenge the 
“execution” of his sentence within the narrow jurisdictional ambit described in Woodall 
                                              
1 When BOP concludes that an inmate, like Briley, represents a greater security risk than 
his normal security level would suggest, he is assigned a Greater Security Management 
Variable.  See BOP Program Statement 5100.08.  Briley alleged that because of this 
enhancement in his security score, he was assigned to a “low-security” prison instead of a 
“prison-camp.” 
 
3 
 
v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 432 F.3d 235, 241 (3d Cir. 2005).  Woodall held that a 
prisoner could bring a § 2241 petition challenging a BOP regulation that limited 
placement in a Community Corrections Center.  We noted that “[c]arrying out a sentence 
through detention in [such a facility was] very different than carrying out a sentence in an 
ordinary penal institution.”  Id. at 243.  Specifically, we determined that Woodall sought 
something well “more than a simple transfer,” observing that his claims “crossed[ed] the 
line beyond a challenge to, for example, a garden variety prison transfer.”  Id.  Here, we 
agree with the District Court that Briley’s claims are much more akin to the “garden 
variety” custody levels that Woodall indicated were excluded from the scope of § 2241.  
Relatedly, we note, prisoners have no constitutional right to a particular classification.  
Moody v. Daggett, 429 U.S. 78, 88 n.9 (1976).  Thus, the District Court correctly 
dismissed Briley’s § 2241 petition.  See Leamer v. Fauver, 288 F.3d 532, 542 (3d Cir. 
2002) (“[W]hen the challenge is to a condition of confinement such that a finding in 
plaintiff’s favor would not alter his sentence or undo his conviction, [a civil rights action] 
is appropriate.”).   
 Accordingly, we will grant the appellees’ motion and summarily affirm the 
judgment of the District Court.  
